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Insider trading rules can affect
attractiveness of country’s stock markets
by Laura N. Beny
The following essay is based on testimony the author delivered to the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on September 26, 2006.

T

he academic debate about the desirability of prohibiting
insider trading is longstanding and as yet unresolved. Until
Henry Manne’s 1966 book, Insider Trading and the Stock Market,
the debate centered on whether insider trading is unfair
to public investors who are not privy to private corporate
information. However, the fairness approach is malleable and
indeterminate and thus does not lend itself to clear-cut policy
prescriptions. Since Manne’s book, the focus of the debate has
been on the effect of insider trading on economic efficiency.
Manne argued that, contrary to the prevailing legal and moral
opinion of the time, insider trading is desirable because it is
economically efficient and thus ought not to be regulated. In
contrast, Manne’s critics argue that insider trading is inefficient
and thus ought to be regulated.
In brief, legal scholars who believe that insider trading is
efficient and thus ought not to be prohibited maintain that
insider trading increases managers’ (and other insiders’)
incentives to behave in the interest of stockholders; makes stock
prices more informationally efficient (that is, more accurate);
and/or does not decrease the liquidity of the stock market. In
contrast, legal scholars who believe that insider trading is inefficient and thus ought to be prohibited argue that insider trading
reduces managers’ (and other insiders’) incentives to behave in
the interest of stockholders; makes stock prices less informationally efficient (that is, less accurate); and/or decreases stock
market liquidity.
The legal academic literature on insider trading suffers from
a few significant shortcomings. One problem with this literature
is that the scholarly debate fails to identify a specific efficiency
locus. The academic inquiry varies from examinations of the
narrow effects of insider trading on efficiency at the firm level
(so-called agency theories of insider trading) to work studying
the broader effects of insider trading on stock market efficiency
(so-called market theories of insider trading). It is possible,
however, that insider trading may enhance efficiency within the
firm, but that markets in which insider trading is permitted are

thereby less efficient in the aggregate. Researchers who focus
their studies at different levels and report different results could
be talking past each other.
A second, major shortcoming of the law and economics literature on insider trading is that it is insufficiently grounded in
empirical evidence. Beginning with Manne’s seminal argument,
legal academic scholarship on insider trading has been largely
speculative and theoretical. Moreover, few scholars sought to
examine the impact of insider trading rules in a comparative
context. However, without variation in insider trading rules
and enforcement, one cannot test causal hypotheses about the
effects of such rules and their enforcement.
Summary of empirical findings
In contrast to most of the existing legal scholarship on
insider trading, my research is empirical and comparative. In
the study “Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around theWorld,”
which I summarize in this brief written testimony, I investigate
whether insider trading laws and enforcement are systematically related to stock market performance across countries. I
formulate three testable hypotheses, which are that countries
with more stringent insider trading laws have (a) more widespread equity ownership; (b) more informative stock prices;
and (c) more liquid stock markets, other things, including
enforcement history and potential, equal. To test these hypotheses, I constructed an index of the stringency of insider trading
laws for 33 countries as of the mid-1990s.
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insider trading laws also tend to have more informative stock
prices, as80measured by stock price synchronicity. (Stock
price synchronicity is a measure of the degree to which the
stock prices of different firms move together, with greater
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co-movement
suggesting that stock prices are less informative
about firm-specific information).
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(a measure of stock market liquidity) than
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Using simple correlations and multivariable regression
analysis, I find that countries with more stringent insider
trading laws have more dispersed equity ownership; more liquid
stock markets; and more informative stock prices, consistent
with the formulated hypotheses. The following three figures,
excerpted from my study “Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets,”
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I confirm these patterns when I conduct multivariable
regression analysis to control for other factors, including past
enforcement history and enforcement potential. Furthermore,
my regressions strongly suggest that the possibility of stringent
criminal or monetary sanctions, rather than the breadth of the insider
trading prohibition, is the more salient feature of countries’ insider
trading laws. Criminal and civil sanctions are more frequently
significant than the scope of the insider trading prohibition in
the regressions that I report in the article. Stringent
public enforcement also seems to be more important than
private enforcement.

Implications of empirical research for the U.S. insider
trading debate
My results are consistent with (but do not prove) the
claim that insider trading laws have a positive impact on stock
markets. More liquid stock markets and more accurate stock
prices reduce the overall cost of equity capital and improve
the efficiency of capital allocation, respectively. Private
parties would be unlikely to give adequate consideration to
these external benefits, if insider trading were left to private
contracting (that is, if firms and shareholders were permitted
to set the firm’s insider trading policy in place of insider trading
regulation). My findings thus support the case for public regulation and correspondingly weaken the case for deregulation of
insider trading. Furthermore, to the extent that insider trading
regulation encourages more accurate stock prices and greater
stock market liquidity, regulation might indirectly ameliorate
corporate agency problems, as more accurate stock prices
and greater liquidity facilitate improved corporate governance
and the market for corporate control. The United States has
the most stringent insider trading rules and enforcement in
the world and recent empirical evidence, including my own,
suggests that this might be at least one reason why investor
confidence is greater in our stock markets than in many
other stock markets of the world. If insider trading laws are
detrimental, as Professor Manne and others have posited, the
patterns I find would have been unlikely.

It is premature, however, to claim that the debate between
proponents and opponents of insider trading laws has now been
empirically resolved. My results must be viewed cautiously
for several reasons. One reason for caution is the crude nature
of the available variables and the small sample of available
countries. It is some consolation that these limitations might be
expected to reduce the likelihood of finding significant relationships, but they nonetheless suggest a need for cautious interpretation. Finally, although my empirical results show a significant
relationship between insider trading laws and various measures
of stock market performance, they do not prove causality.
The appropriate conclusion to reach from this research is not
that the arguments of proponents of insider trading regulation
have been proven to be sounder than the arguments of those
who criticize such regulation, but rather that there is greater
reason to believe in their soundness than there was before this
study was conducted. If insider trading laws are detrimental, as
Professor Manne and others have suggested, the patterns I find
would have been improbable.
Further empirical research on this issue is warranted, such
as the assembly of more adequate cross-sectional data from a
broader range of countries and over a longer range of time. My
research is but a first step. It can help to resolve the theoretical
conflict (and perhaps contribute to the articulation of a more
coherent insider trading legal doctrine and policy in the United
States) only if consistent empirical work follows.
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